This study examines how accounting conservatism may affect the information environment of analysts' earnings forecasts, taking into account the interaction between unconditional and conditional conservatism. Unconditional conservatism preempts conditional conservatism in the later period and reduces the uncertainty in loss recognition associated with bad news. Through a simple analyst forecast model, I
Introduction
Empirical research about analysts' forecasts largely concerns the questions whether and why analysts' forecasts are systematically biased. However, the literature does not provide consistent answers to these questions. Early studies usually referred to the negative mean forecast errors as evidence of analysts' optimistic bias in forecasts; recent studies question the underlying quadratic loss function assumption in using mean forecast error as a measure of forecast bias and find that under linear loss function assumption, analysts' forecasts are not systematically biased (Gu and Wu, 2003; Basu and Markov, 2004) . As to the explanations for the forecast bias, some studies propose the cognitive bias explanation which argues that analysts are irrational in their forecasts (Elgers and Lo, 1994; Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992) . Other explanations assume that analysts are indeed rational, but they are driven by their own incentives to issue optimistic forecasts to facilitate information access to the management (Lim, 2001; Das et al, 1998; Ke and Yu, 2006) . Given these inconclusive results, Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) examine the crosssectional distribution of forecast errors and demonstrate how the tail asymmetry and middle asymmetry in the distribution play a role in generating conflicting statistical evidences on analysts' bias and forecast efficiency in prior studies. Their results show that the common belief that analysts generally produce optimistic forecasts is not well supported by a broader analysis of the distribution of forecast errors. However, it still remains a question whether observed analysts' forecast bias is evidence of incentive and cognitive-based theories of analyst forecast. Moreover, as Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) and other studies point out, properties embedded in reported earnings can also affect the observed analysts' forecast errors.
In this paper, I develop a rational analyst forecast model where the reported earnings are generated from conservative accounting system, which characterizes both unconditional and conditional conservatism. The model well explains some commonly observed patterns in analysts' forecast errors without assuming the analyst's incentive or behavior bias. Analysts' forecasts errors can be either pessimistic or optimistic, depending on the realized economic news in the forecast period. The model's prediction is also consistent with two asymmetries in analysts' forecast error distribution documented by Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) .
Beyond the conformity to prior research's results, the main implication from the forecast model is about the role of unconditional conservatism in reducing the uncertainty of earnings recognition due to conditional conservatism. In this model, the uncertainty in forecasting earnings comes from an unexpected economic shock in the forecast period. The recognition of unexpected shock in earnings follows the conditional conservative accounting rule, which creates more uncertainty in reported earnings for bad news firms than for good news firms. However, ex-ante unconditional conservatism will reduce this uncertainty as more unconditional conservatism is associated with less conditional conservatism in future periods (Beaver and Ryan, 2005, etc) . For example, when intangible assets such as R&D expenditures are immediately expensed, the firm does not need to write off the asset in the future when bad news about the R&D project occurs, as there is no carrying value on the book asset for R&D expenditures. On the other hand, good news about the project will not be recognized immediately in current earnings due to conditional conservatism principle. Instead, it will be gradually recognized in accounting earnings in the following periods as cash flows become verifiable. Hence, the overall uncertainty in the future earnings associated with R&D expenditures is reduced because of ex-ante unconditional conservatism.
Based on analysts' rational expectation of future earnings by incorporating the possibility of recognizing unexpected economic shock, the model shows that: a) for firms with positive economic shock or small negative economic shock, unconditional conservatism reduces the forecast error measured by actual earnings minus forecasted earnings; b) for firms with very large negative economic shock, unconditional conservatism increases the forecast error. A second prediction from the model is that the variance of analysts' forecasts decreases with unconditional conservatism. These results hold for analysts' early forecasts, when unexpected economic shocks are not realized at the beginning of forecast period. For late forecasts it is assumed that analysts can obtain perfect information about the economic shock toward the end of forecast period. Therefore analysts' late forecasts will be uncorrelated with unconditional conservatism.
Empirical tests of the model's predictions use the bias component in book-tomarket ratio adjusted for lagged returns in Beaver and Ryan (2000) . The empirical results show that analysts forecast errors are negatively associated with unconditional conservatism for good news and mild bad news firms, but positively associated with unconditional conservatism for extreme bad news firms. Analysts' absolute forecast errors are negatively associated with unconditional conservatism for all firms. To test the second prediction of the model, the overall uncertainty (V) implied in analysts' forecasts proposed by Barron et. al (1998) is used. Consistent with the second prediction, the result shows that the overall uncertainty in analysts' forecasts is decreasing with unconditional conservatism for both good news and bad news firms. In addition, the results also suggest that the impact of unconditional conservatism on forecast errors and overall uncertainty is greater for analysts' early forecasts than for late forecasts. This provides stronger evidence of the model, since the uncertainty in analysts' early forecasts before observing the economic shock is higher than in late forecasts when the economic shock has been revealed to the pubic. The findings are also robust to LAD (linear absolute deviation) estimation method under the linear objective function assumption. This paper contributes to the literature in the following aspects. Firstly, this paper contributes to the literature on analysts' forecasts with regard to conservative accounting information. Prior research has examined the link between analysts' forecast bias and earnings skewness or bias. Because conservative accounting restricts the amount of positive accruals that a firm can recognize in a given period, earnings are negatively skewed or biased. If the loss function of analysts depends on mean absolute forecast error instead of mean square error (Gu and Wu, 2003) , or if analysts do not anticipate large negative "unexpected accruals" (Abarbanell and Levahy, 2003) , forecast bias is likely to be related to earnings skewness. However, this study shows that analysts anticipate the effect of conservative recognition in earnings, but they can not perfectly forecast the unexpected economic shocks. Therefore unconditional conservatism reduces the uncertainty for both good news firms and bad news firms.
Moreover, the robustness of LAD test results further confirms that regardless of analysts' forecast function, analysts do not completely ignore or fail to incorporate the impact of conditional conservatism in recognizing bad news in the forecast period.
Secondly, prior studies have found that analysts' forecasts are affected by the information uncertainty about firms' future performance and accounting earnings. Das et al (1998) find that firms with earnings difficult to predict using times series model are also difficult for analysts to predict. They argue that analysts will issue more optimistic forecast for firms with greater uncertainty in order to facilitate the information access to management. A recent study by Zhang (2006) shows that greater information uncertainty lead to more positive (negative) forecast errors following good (bad) news. Zhang (2006) argues that the result supports the behavior-cognitive bias explanation for observed analysts forecast errors. My results are more close to Zhang (2006)'s results since I also find that lower unconditional conservatism is associated with more positive (negative) forecast errors for good (bad) news firms as there is more information uncertainty in forecasted earnings. However, the results do not depend on the analyst's cognitive bias or incentive assumptions.
Finally, Pae and Thornton (2006) examine whether analysts can fully understand the implication of conservative recognition principle in term of earnings' asymmetric timeliness to recognize bad news versus good news. Unlike their study, this paper does not attempt to examine the efficiency or loss function of analysts' forecasts. The empirical results suggest that analysts take into account the beginning period information about past conservatism and anticipate future conservatism in earnings recognition. However, we can not draw the conclusion about analysts' forecast efficiency. The result enriches our understanding about the correlation between analysts' forecast errors and underlying earnings properties imposed by accounting conservatism.
Next section reviews the literature on accounting conservatism. Section 3 presents a simple model of analysts' forecast and develops testable propositions. Section 4 describes the sample data and research design. The main empirical results are in section 5, and section 6 concludes the paper.
Unconditional and conditional accounting conservatism
Accountants traditionally express conservatism by the rule that "anticipates no profits but anticipates all losses". Contingent on the time at which the asymmetric accounting treatment of profits versus losses applies, accounting conservatism can be classified into two types. One is ex-ante or unconditional conservatism, which is the understatement of net book value to market value due to routinely biased accounting practices independent of contemporaneous economic news. The immediate expensing of intangible assets such as internal developed R&D and historical accounting for positive NPV projects are examples of unconditional conservatism. The other is ex-post or conditional conservatism, which is defined as the asymmetric timeliness of accounting practice to recognize contemporaneous economic gains versus losses. Since conservatism implies the accountant's tendency to require a higher degree of verification for recognizing good news in earnings than for bad news, Basu predicts and finds that earnings response to negative returns (bad news) is higher than to positive returns (good news). Basu's measure of conservatism is more consistent with the view of conditional conservatism.
The center of distinguishing the two types of conservatism is the timing of earnings recognition relative to cash flows. Since a firm's accounting earnings sum up to the total cash flows realized in its entire operating life, unconditional and conditional conservatism are inherently linked to each other. Recent papers (Pope and Walker, 2003; Pae et al 2005) show empirically that higher unconditional conservatism measured by market to book ratio is associated with lower conditional conservatism measured by the asymmetric earnings-return response. A more comprehensive and structured analysis of the interaction between unconditional and conditional conservatism under uncertainty is theoretically modeled by Beaver and Ryan (2005) .
They model how unrecorded goodwill (or accounting slack) generated by unconditional conservatism preempts the application of conditional conservatism in later periods. The accelerated depreciation of tangible assets, past unrecognized positive shocks to the market value or the immediate expensing of intangible assets can all yield accounting slack. The accounting slack in assets will reduce the likelihood of asset write-down or the amount of write-down if one occurs. In the extreme if a firm is unconditionally conservative in writing off expenditures in the beginning, there will not be any capitalized amount carried on its balance sheet to be written off when bad news occurs regarding the future benefits of these expenditures.
In term of its impact on future earnings, conservatism has two primary effects. First, unconditional conservatism, such as R&D expenses, will immediately suppress the earnings in current period and result in more volatile earnings, compared to the accounting policy of capitalization and amortization which aims to smooth earnings recognition throughout the asset life. However, as shown in Penman (2006) , this effect of unconditional conservatism matters only if the firm's investment keeps growing. If the investment of the firm is constant or reasonably predictable, the consistent application of unconditional conservative accounting does not create additional difficulty or uncertainty in earnings forecasts.
Second, conditional conservatism will also result in transitory negative earnings such as asset write down or impairment loss in the period with new information and increase earning volatility. But the relationship between unconditional and conditional conservatism suggests that ex-ante unconditional conservatism could reduce the possible impairment loss or asset write down associated with unexpected economic shocks about the underlying asset value in the future. Since unexpected economic shocks are more difficult to predict ex-ante, the second impact of unconditional conservatism seems more relevant concerning forecasting future earnings.
Therefore this paper focuses on the second impact of conservatism on the information uncertainty involved in forecasting future earnings, i.e, the role of unconditional conservatism in reducing the information uncertainty in analyst forecasts caused by conditional conservatism with regard to recognizing future earnings.
A simple model and hypotheses development
Consider a one period analyst forecast model. The total earnings that analysts aim to forecast consist of two independent streams: normal earnings ( t x ) and abnormal earnings ( t Δ ). I assume that normal earnings involve mostly easy-to-verify information and analysts can predict them from past earnings without much difficulty. 
Even though analysts claim that they do not forecast extraordinary and special items, we can interpret the abnormal earnings in the model not as extraordinary as in the common sense. Analysts are well aware that these economic shocks happen in every period following certain probability distribution. Therefore they can not completely ignore this component of earnings in their forecasts. For example, bad debt write-off or inventory write-down due to "lower of cost and market value" principle is part of operating expense that should be included in analysts' forecasts. To observe the effect of unconditional conservatism more directly, I assume that there is no private information beyond the relevant information such as last period earnings and unconditional conservatism which are publicly available to all analysts.
Analysts' forecast analyzed here is therefore the consensus forecast.
Analysts' early forecasts
Immediately after announcement of last period (t-1) earnings, analysts have not observed the unexpected economic shock in period t. I define the analyst forecast made at this time as early forecast. I also assume that analysts, with sophisticated accounting knowledge, can identify the amount of 1 − t c from last period's financial reports.
Analysts' early forecasts of total earnings are based on the rational expectation conditional on their information about last period's earnings and unconditional conservatism:
I define the analysts' forecast error as the difference between realized earnings and analysts' forecast. Then the early forecast error is represented as: 
, on average we are more likely to observe optimistic forecasts; otherwise we are more likely to observe pessimistic forecasts. Second, the two asymmetries documented in Abarbanell and
Lehavy (2003) can also be observed in this model. Because of conditional conservatism in accounting, the asymmetry timeliness recognition principle makes 1 < α . When α is sufficiently small, for extreme news firms (i.e, for very large t s ) the magnitude of negative forecast error for bad news firms will be greater than the magnitude of positive forecast error for extreme good news. This will be the tail asymmetry. But when we examine firms with small news in the middle, the opposite asymmetry is observed in forecast errors. Since the bad news recognition is preempted by unconditional conservatism for small bad news firms, it is more likely to observe the small positive forecast errors around zero. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) (4) Proposition 1a suggests that the impact of unconditional conservatism on forecast error depends on the realization of economic news. We can also draw some implication about the impact of unconditional conservatism on forecast accuracy (absolute forecast error). As in the model analysts' forecasts are on average more pessimistic for firms with greater good news and more optimistic for firms with greater bad news. Therefore the opposite impacts of unconditional conservatism on forecast errors actually under two scenarios imply that analysts' absolute forecast errors are overall smaller for firms with more accounting slack.
The variance of expected total earnings conditioned on the last period earnings and unconditional conservatism can also be derived from the model: , therefore we can get proposition 1a.
5 Proof: 4
As the announcement date of period t earnings approaches, the economic shock occurred during period t becomes known to analysts. I define the analyst forecast made at this time as late forecast. At the late forecast, there is no uncertainty in forecasting firm's total earnings unless we assume that managers can discretionally determine the write down of assets in application of conditional conservatism and analysts can not perfectly be informed about the manager's action. Proposition 1 and 2 are consistent with extant empirical evidence that more recent analysts' forecasts are more accurate (and less biased) as analysts receive additional earnings relevant information (Brown, 1991; Sinha, et al, 1997) . At the beginning of forecast period, analysts possess less information about future earnings and face greater uncertainty in forecasting earnings. Therefore we expect greater role of unconditional conservatism (available accounting slack) in reducing the information uncertainty in forecasts at early forecasts than at late forecasts. The model also shows that analysts' forecasts incorporate both income statement and balance sheet information. Even though conditional conservatism ex-post applies only to bad news firms, ex-ante both good news and bad news firms experience the same uncertainty of future economic shocks. Accordingly unconditional conservatism influences forecast errors and information uncertainty of both types of firms.
As discussed in section 2, the difference between unconditional (ex-ante) conservatism and conditional (ex-post) conservatism is essentially the timing of the asymmetric accounting treatment on positive versus negative economic outcome.
Application of conditional conservatism may result in less smoothed earnings as large negative unexpected loss is more likely to be recognized in accounting earnings (Basu, 1997 , Gassen et al 2006 . In addition, the timely recognition often requires the estimation of loss before the cash realization, which involves larger estimation errors and lower persistent earnings (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005b) . Hence, accounting earnings become more volatile and difficult to predict because of the application of conditional conservatism. This model shows that unconditional conservatism plays a role in reducing the uncertainty involved in future recognition of bad news due to conditional conservatism, and therefore is critical to analysts' forecast accuracy. The integral relationship between unconditional conservatism and conditional conservatism drives the result.
Sample and Research Design

Sample Data
I test the empirical implications of the model using annual data, since the integral approach in interim reporting implies applications of some conservatism principles are adjusted at the fiscal year end. 6 The sample consists of all firm-year observations from 1986 to 2004. I construct analysts' earnings consensus forecast data from I/BE/S detail file. Specifically analysts' early forecast is constructed as consensus forecast within first three months after last period earnings announcement, and late forecast as consensus forecast within last three months before next earnings announcement date.
Therefore I delete those observations with missing earnings announcement date. For I/B/E/S data, I require at least two analysts following the firm during the year. Stock price and return data are retrieved from CRSP monthly return file. Other necessary accounting data comes from COMPUSTAT industrial annual file. I also exclude the financial institutional firms with SIC code 6000 to 6999 from my sample. I winsorize the data to the upper and lower 1% percentiles for each variable used in the regression.
The final sample contains 8,415 firm-year early forecast observations and 6,672 firmyear late forecast observations respectively.
Variables measurement Analysts' forecast error
Early and late forecast errors are measured by the difference between actual earnings and analysts' early and late consensus forecasts deflated by the beginning period stock price: Barron et al (1998) present that the level of overall uncertainty (V) implied in analysts' forecasts is determined by the precision of public and idiosyncratic information possessed by analysts.
Uncertainty in analysts' forecasts
7 Therefore I use their measure of overall uncertainty to empirically test the impact of unconditional conservatism. Following Barron et al (1998) , the overall uncertainty V can be expressed from observable forecast dispersion, error in the mean forecast and the number of forecasts:
, where N is the number of forecasts issued; D is the expected dispersion of analysts' forecasts; SE is the expected squared error in the mean forecast.
The empirical measure uses the ex-post analysts' forecast dispersion and ex-post squared forecast error to calculate the level of overall uncertainty for early and late forecasts respectively: 
Unconditional conservatism measure: Beaver and Ryan (2000)
Unconditional conservatism measure I use in this paper is from Beaver and Ryan 
Control variables
I also include a set of control variables in the multivariate regression model. These variables control for factors such as earnings properties, information environment, manager incentives, and firm's investment behavior. I use the same set of control variables in both the forecast errors and overall uncertainty regressions, because the factors that affect the uncertainty are also likely to affect the forecast errors.
For underlying earnings properties I control for the unexpected earnings, the loss reporting, and earnings volatility. Following prior research which documents the underreaction of analysts to information contained in prior unexpected earnings change (Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992) (Brown, 2001) and to control part of the earnings skewness effect (Gu and Wu, 2003) . Prior research also argues that analysts' forecast error is associated with the predictability of earnings (Das, et al 1998) .
Since more volatile earnings are usually more difficult to predict, I include earnings volatility (
STDROA , ) to capture the predictability.
Analysts' forecasts are also affected by the information environment of firm and analysts. Firm size is usually viewed as a proxy for the amount of information publicly available about a firm (Das, et.al, 1998) . Therefore I control for firm size in the model, using the logarithm of market value of common equity (
LGMV ) at the beginning of period t . Another indicator of information environment is the number of analysts issuing forecasts (
LGNUM , and
LGNUM , ), since larger number of analysts following suggests greater competition among analysts, which might induce them to issue more optimistic forecasts in order to compete for management favor. I also use the past six-month accumulative returns (
_ and
_ ) to proxy for other information revealed to the market that might affect analysts' forecast behavior.
Managers' incentive and discretion in financial reporting will make it difficult for analysts to predict the 'right' bottom line numbers. For example, upon observing an extremely negative economic shock, managers may decide to take an "unexpected earnings bath", recognizing larger operating expenses through discretionary negative 
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
) is -0.0005 (0.0003). The negative mean forecast error is consistent with the evidence that analysts' forecasts are optimistic in general, especially at the beginning of the forecast period. The median forecast error is much smaller than the mean, which might imply that analysts forecast the median rather than the mean (Gu and Wu, 2003; Basu and Markov, 2005) . A similar pattern is observed for the absolute forecast error. The average early absolute early forecast error is larger than the late absolute forecast error, i.e, analysts' recent forecasts are more accurate. The standard deviation of early forecast errors is also higher than the standard deviation of late forecast errors. The mean and median of overall uncertainty implied in analysts' early forecasts ( firm in my sample has about $581 million market capitalization. This is expected as the sample selection requirement of at least two analysts following will bias toward large firms. The average discretionary accrual is negative, suggesting that income-decreasing accruals a firm can recognize in a given period is larger than income-increasing accruals due to conservative accounting principles. The mean of changes in special item is negative and the median is zero, consistent with prior research's results that managers usually report bad news in special items to highlight the transitory nature of these items. The average growth in net operating asset of my sample firms is about 5.78% of total assets.
[Insert Table 1]   Table 2 examines the forecast properties of firms with different economic shocks in the fiscal year. As equation (4) shows, the magnitude and sign of analysts' forecast error depend on the realization of unexpected economics shocks during the forecast period. I classify the firms into five groups based on the economic news proxied by the market adjusted stock return in the fiscal year, and compare the forecast errors and overall uncertainty across these groups. Table 1 indicates that analysts' forecast is optimistic on average. However, when breaking down into different groups, analysts' forecast error is monotonically increasing with the economic news. For early forecasts, the forecast error is positive (with mean 0.0042) for very good news firms (quintile 5), but significantly negative (with mean -0.0288) for very bad news firms (quintile 1). For late forecasts, similar pattern can be observed but the magnitude of forecast error is much smaller than early forecasts. These results support the basic assumption of the analyst forecast model: analysts incorporate the expected conditional conservative recognition principle when constructing their own rational expectation of earnings for both good news and bad news firms. Therefore we could observe the positive forecast errors in good news firms and negative forecast errors in very bad news firms.
Both the absolute forecast error ( [Insert Table 2] 
Analysts' forecast and unconditional conservatism: univariate analysis
The role of unconditional conservatism is to reduce the uncertainty involved in future recognition of unexpected economic shocks. A comparison of earnings distributions for firms with high and low unconditional conservatism will help to understand the impact of unconditional conservatism on the recognition of earnings. Figure 1 shows the histograms of earnings per share for the extreme lowest and highest UCON quintiles. The variance of earnings for firms with highest unconditional conservatism is apparently larger than that for firms with lowest unconditional conservatism. This suggests that the uncertainty in earnings is larger for firms with greater unconditional conservatism.
[Insert Figure 1] Next I perform the univariate analysis on the correlation between unconditional conservatism and analysts' forecast properties. Table 3 reports the mean and median of signed forecast errors, absolute forecast errors, and overall uncertainty of analysts' forecasts for firms in each unconditional conservatism quintile. The quintile ranking is based on the cross-sectional unconditional conservatism within each year. Panel A and panel B report the statistics on early and late forecast variables respectively. I first calculate the forecast error across UCON quintiles for very bad news firms and very good news firms separately. The model predicts that the correlation between forecast error and unconditional conservatism for firms with good news is different from the correlation for firms with very bad news. Consistent with the prediction for different economic news firms, it can be observed that the mean (median) forecast error for very bad news firms is on average less negative as the firm becomes more unconditionally conservative. On the contrary, the mean (median) forecast error for very good news firms in on average less positive as the firm becomes more unconditionally conservative. For the absolute forecast error and overall uncertainty, the model's prediction is uniformly consistent. For these two variables Table 3 shows that both the mean and median of absolute forecast error and overall uncertainty in analysts' forecasts are monotonically decreasing from lowest to highest unconditional conservatism firms. For all three variables, the pattern exists in both early and late forecasts; however, the magnitude is smaller in late forecasts.
[Insert Table 3 The analyst forecast model predicts that unconditional conservatism is uncorrelated with forecast error at late forecasts. The no-impact prediction at late forecasts relies on one crucial assumption of the model that analysts obtain perfect information about the economic shock and manager's recognition discretion. Therefore empirically I expect that unconditional conservatism and late forecast errors might still be correlated, however the coefficient of unconditional conservatism in late forecasts will be smaller than in early forecasts.
[Insert Table 4 ] (-0.0042 and -0.0012 accordingly). This is consistent with the hypotheses that analysts' forecast error decreases with unconditional conservatism available to firm for good news or mild bad news firms, but increases with unconditional conservatism for very bad news firms. As forecast errors for very bad news firms are in general more optimistic than other firms (Table 2) , the results suggest that the optimism decreases for more unconditional conservative firms.
The comparison between early and late forecasts indicates that the coefficients of unconditional conservatism on forecast error are much larger at early forecasts than at late forecasts: -0.0042 vs -0.0012 for LGMV , ), consistent with prior findings. Larger number of analysts following (
LGNUM , ) is associated with more optimistic forecasts, probably due to analysts' incentives to compete for manager's favor by issuing optimistic forecasts. The earnings volatility is significantly positively associated with forecast error. The stock return in the last six months is also positively correlated with forecast error, suggesting that analysts underreact to the information in past stock return. The coefficient of changes in special item is significantly positive, consistent with the general consensus that analysts do not tend to forecast negative special items due to their transitory nature. For firms experiencing greater increase in net operating assets last year, analysts seem not fully understand the implication of change in investment on the future earnings as in Penman and Zhang (2002).
Analysts' forecast accuracy and unconditional conservatism: multivariate regression
An extension of empirical tests is to examine the impact of unconditional conservatism on analysts' forecast accuracy. The empirical results above show that the association between unconditional conservatism and forecast error is not uniformly consistent. However, in terms of absolute forecast error, we expect that the association between absolute forecast error and unconditional conservatism will be negative for both good news firms and very bad news firms, as unconditional conservatism reduces the forecast bias in either direction (optimism or pessimism). I test the correlation between unconditional conservatism and forecast accuracy using the following model:
The forecast accuracy ( t i AFE , ) is measured by the absolute value of forecast error.
No interaction term is necessary in equation (7) and I expect that the coefficient of t i UCON , will be negative for the whole sample. I take the absolute values for some control variables such as unexpected earnings, discretionary accrual, change in special items and change in net operating asset, because it's difficult for analysts to forecast the earnings of firms with both large positive and negative values in these variables.
[Insert Table 5 ] Table 5 presents the regression results for testing the forecast accuracy model (7) for early and late forecast samples. I again use both OLS and LAD estimation methods.
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In all regressions the coefficients of In general, the results so far provide supportive empirical evidence to proposition 1 and 2 with regard to the impact of unconditional conservatism on analysts' forecast errors. The LAD estimation reaches the same conclusion as OLS, suggesting that the association between conservatism and forecast errors exists regardless whether analysts' forecast objective is mean or median.
Overall uncertainty and unconditional conservatism: multivariate regression
In this section I test the model's implication with regard to the association between the overall uncertainty in analysts' forecasts and unconditional conservatism. I estimate the following model for both early and late forecast samples:
V , is the overall uncertainty implied in analysts' forecasts following Barron et al (1998) . [Insert Table 6]   Table 6 presents the regression results for testing the impact of unconditional conservatism on the overall uncertainty in analysts' forecasts. Only OLS estimation is performed. The coefficients of unconditional conservatism are both significantly negative in the early and late forecast samples. This is consistent with the model's prediction that unconditional conservatism will reduce the overall uncertainty in analysts' forecasts, i.e, increase the precision of public information available to analysts.
1 is -0.0093(5.09) at early forecasts and -0.0018 (4.69) at late forecasts, suggesting that unconditional conservatism has smaller impact on the overall uncertainty in analysts' early forecasts than in late forecasts.
Results on other control variables show that overall uncertainty in analysts'
forecasts is higher for firms with larger unexpected earnings in last period or reporting loss in the forecast period. Larger firms have smaller uncertainty as more information is available. More analysts following increase the overall uncertainty in forecasts, probably due to more idiosyncratic information dispersion among different analysts. In addition, firms with larger changes in special item and net operating asset also have greater uncertainty. However firms with more volatile return on asset seem to have lower uncertainty, which is opposite to the expectation.
Conclusion
This paper develops and empirically tests a rational analyst forecast model under conservative accounting system, considering the interaction between two types of accounting conservatism. The integral relationship between unconditional and conditional conservatism suggests that more unconditional conservatism will preempt application of conditional conservatism in later period, therefore lead to less uncertainty about the amount of earnings to be recognized in presence of bad news in later period.
The reduction of information uncertainty in future earnings recognition may benefit analysts with less biased and more accurate forecasts.
A simple model is developed in the paper to illustrate the relationship between analysts' forecast properties and accounting conservatism. The empirical evidence is consistent with model's predictions about analysts' forecast errors and overall uncertainty implied in analysts' forecasts. For the signed forecast error measured by actual minus forecasted earnings, unconditional conservatism reduces the forecast error for firms with positive economic shock or small negative economic shock, but increases the forecast error for firms with very large negative economic shock. I find that the absolute forecast error and overall uncertainty are both negatively associated with unconditional conservatism available at the beginning of forecast period for all firms. The relationship is stronger at early forecasts than at late forecasts, suggesting that unconditional conservatism plays more important role in reducing the information uncertainty at early forecasts when the uncertainty about future economic news is higher. The result is robust to the LAD estimation.
The impacts of accounting conservatism on the information uncertainty and volatility in future earnings have not been fully explored in the literature. This study mainly focuses on one aspect of unconditional conservatism's impacts on future earnings that is driven by the interaction between two types of conservatism. As discussed in the introduction, unconditional conservatism itself could also lead to more uncertainty in forecasting earnings in the period of unexpected investment changes. In order to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of this question, future research needs to consider both aspects of unconditional conservatism and incorporate investment behavior and accounting policies into the analysis. V , are the overall uncertainty implied in analysts' early and late forecasts.
LGNUM , are the logarithms of the number of analysts issuing forecasts in the early and late forecast periods. LGMV is the logarithm of common equity market value at the beginning of period t. 
